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Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives:  
The Case of Tipping 
 
Abstract 
The article examines the optimal choice of monitoring intensity when workers face external 
incentives (incentives that are not provided by the firm), such as tips, satisfaction from working 
well, or the desire to build reputation in order to be more attractive to other employers. Increase 
in such external incentives reduces optimal monitoring intensity but nevertheless increases effort 
and profits unambiguously. The model explains why US firms supported the establishment of 
tipping in the late 19
th century but raises the possibility that European firms make costly mistakes 




 1.  Introduction 
Tipping is a significant economic activity, and yet its economic implications have hardly 
been explored. Tips in US restaurants alone are around $27 billion a year.
1 Obviously, adding 
tips in other establishments such as hotels and taxis, and in additional countries, results in a much 
higher figure. Millions of workers depend heavily on tip income. Wessels (1997), for example, 
reports that in the United States alone there are over two million people who are servers as their 
primary occupation, and the number may be 60 percent higher if we add those who are servers as 
a secondary occupation. He adds that tips represent 58 percent of servers’ income in full-course 
restaurants and 61 percent in counters, and that these figures are likely to be understated because 
servers often underreport their tip income. Finally, tipping has become a source of income in 
many different occupations: Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993), for example, consider 33 service 
professions that are tipped.  
How has tipping become such a prevalent social norm? Who has an incentive to support it? 
Do firms benefit from tipping, and in what ways? I analyze the interaction between tipping, 
which can be thought of as buyer monitoring, and monitoring by the firm. The analysis suggests 
that by motivating workers to provide better service, tipping enables the firm to reduce its costly 




1 The extent of tipping has to be estimated because tips are often unreported for tax purposes (according to 
Hemenway (1993) the only income with a lower compliance rate is illegal income). Sales in the United States in 
2002 of food and alcoholic beverages to consumers in full-service restaurants, bars and taverns, and lodging places, 
were $146.7, $13.3 and $18.6 billion, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002; the numbers for 2002 are a 
projection). Summing the three numbers and multiplying by an average tip of 15 percent yields annual tips of $26.8 
billion.  monitoring of workers and to increase the price it charges (because of the increased service 
quality). Therefore, tipping increases the profits of the firm, so firms have an incentive to support 
the tipping custom.  
While the article focuses on the case of tipping
2, the theoretical model is applicable to 
additional examples in which workers face external incentives (incentives that are not provided 
by the firm). One such example is the satisfaction that workers derive from doing their job well, 
especially in jobs that require initiative and creativity. This satisfaction (often referred to as 
“intrinsic motivation”) motivates workers to excel even when they face no monetary incentives 
to do so.  
Another example is that of military pilots: their future prospects and expected salaries as civil 
pilots later in life depend on their performance in the military, thus providing them additional 
incentives to do their job well beyond the incentives provided by the military.
3 Similarly, anyone 
who thinks he may change employers in the future (whether voluntarily or not) has an incentive 
to work well in order to be more attractive to the next employer. Potential employers receive 
information about previous performance of the candidate from various sources, such as letters of 
reference and items on the curriculum vitae. Consequently, current performance affects the 
candidate’s reputation and his prospects with other employers, giving him incentives to work 
well that are not provided by the firm.  
                                                 
2 In particular, I find it more concrete to talk about a specific tipping occasion, although the analysis and the ideas 
are applicable to tipping in general. Tipping in restaurants is the natural candidate, as it is the most common form of 




3 I thank James MacDonald for this example. The common theme in all the above examples is that the worker faces external incentives to 
do what the firm also wants to achieve. In the case of tipping, tips promote higher service 
quality, and the firm wants to encourage high service quality as well; similarly, self-fulfillment 
and satisfaction from being successful, or reputation building in order to improve one’s value in 
the job market, motivate the worker to work harder, which is also what the firm wants. 
  The existing literature about tipping is mostly empirical, and includes two main types of 
studies. One type interviews customers when they leave a restaurant and tries to evaluate which 
variables affect the tip size (for example, does food quality affect tips?). Major contributions of 
this type include Bodvarsson and Gibson (1994, 1997). A second type of study asks waiters to 
behave in a certain way (for example to touch the customer lightly or to write “Thank you!” on 
the bill) and records the effect of this behavior on tips, using a control group as a benchmark (see 
for example Crusco and Wetzel, 1984).
4 A unique and interesting study about tipping is the 
experimental article of Ruffle (1998), in which participants in dictator and ultimatum games 
acted in a way that resembles tipping.   
  The theoretical work on tipping started with the pioneering work of Ben-Zion and Karni 
(1977), who show that tipping is consistent with a selfish customer only for the case of a 
repeated customer. They suggest that in order to explain why one-time customers tip one should 
consider altruistic behavior and social norms, which are not included in their model. Jacob and 
Page (1980) suggest that optimal monitoring may involve monitoring by both the owner and the 
buyer who interacts with the monitored employee. Sisk and Gallick (1985) argue that tips 
ultimately protect the buyer from an unscrupulous seller (or his agent) when the brand-name 
mechanism for assuring contractual performance is insufficient. Schwartz (1997) suggests that 
 
4 For an excellent review of the empirical literature on tipping see Lynn and McCall (2000a). 
 
                                                 
5 tipping can increase the firm’s profits when it enables price discrimination between two 
consumer segments that differ in their demand functions and their propensity to tip. Ruffle 
(1999) presents a theoretical model about gift giving and discusses briefly how the model can be 
applied to tipping as well. Azar (2003a) presents a model of the evolution of social norms. When 
a norm is costly to follow and people do not derive benefits from following it except for avoiding 
social disapproval, the norm erodes over time. Tip percentages, however, increased over the 
years, suggesting that people derive benefits from tipping, such as impressing others and 
improving their self-image as being generous and kind.  
  In this article, I analyze the optimal choice of monitoring and incentives by the firm when 
the worker faces external incentives that encourage him to do what the firm also wants to 
achieve. The theoretical analysis suggests that firms benefit from higher sensitivity of tips to 
service quality, because it enables them to reduce the cost of monitoring. This implies that firms 
should encourage customers to tip badly (or not at all) for bad service, rather than to always tip. 
In addition, as long as tips are positively correlated with service quality, firms benefit from the 
existence of tipping. This result is consistent with historical evidence that suggests that US firms 
promoted the custom of tipping in the late 19
th century, despite attempts of several consumer 
groups, and even workers, to abolish the custom (Segrave, 1998; Azar, 2003b). This result, 
however, also suggests that numerous European firms that replaced tips with service charges 
possibly made a costly mistake. I discuss, however, why this might not be a mistake after all. 
The model also implies that in countries in which tipping is not prevalent, for example in Japan, 
Australia and the Scandinavian countries, firms may do better by trying to promote the custom of 
tipping.  
  The discussion above suggests that the main contributions of this article can be categorized 
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 as follows: first, it addresses the issue of optimal monitoring in the presence of external 
incentives. Tips, intrinsic motivation, and reputation building are a few examples of such 
incentives. Second, the article contributes to the literature about tipping, analyzing the 
relationship between tipping and monitoring by the firm. Finally, the article compares the 
theoretical predictions to the behavior of firms in the United States and Europe and offers a 
potential explanation to the puzzle regarding the choices of European firms.    
2.  The model 
The game involves two players (a firm and a worker) and two stages. In the first stage the 
firm chooses how intensely to monitor the waiter, which in turn determines also the incentives to 
provide good service that the waiter faces. In the second stage the waiter chooses the service 
quality to provide, and then receives both his tip and the incentives from the firm according to 
the service quality chosen. The tip is potentially increasing in the service quality provided. This 
may follow from the social norm being that better service should be rewarded by a higher tip. 
Alternatively, it may follow from the customer trying to discipline the waiter in a repeated-
interaction scenario: the customer gives better tips for better service in order to motivate the 
waiter to give good service in future encounters. The task that the waiter has to perform is to 
serve a single customer. Serving a table of four can be considered as having four identical tasks; 
the effort and incentives are simply four times those for serving a single customer. I assume for 
simplicity that the bill size per customer is constant.  
 
2.1.   Service quality 
  Let us denote service quality by s and define s = 0 to be the service quality that minimizes 
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 the waiter’s effort. The assumption that such quality exists follows from the observation that 
below some quality level, reducing quality is in fact costly for the waiter. For example, being too 
slow and bringing the food cold may result in a requirement to heat the food, which causes the 
waiter more effort than bringing the food hot in the first place. Similarly, being rude may be 
more costly than just being unfriendly. 
Since service quality has no natural scale, we can scale it as we wish. I choose to scale it in a 
way that makes the tip linear in service quality.
5 That is, choose s = 1 to represent an arbitrary 
quality level that is better than s = 0. Denote the tip left for s = 0 as T0 and the tip left for s = 1 as 
T0 + T. Now define s = 2 to be the quality level that results in a tip of T0 + 2T and so on. As a 
result, the tip is linear in service quality. Let T0 + sT be the tip in dollars given for service quality 
s, where T0 ≥ 0 and T ≥ 0.
6  
 
2.2.   The firm 
  Monitoring by the firm provides incentives for the waiter to give good service, in addition to 
the incentives provided by tips. The firm can punish bad service by dismissing the waiter or 
giving him bad shifts, bad tables, or fewer tables to serve. On the other hand, it can reward good 
service by giving the waiter more tables to serve and better shifts and tables. Whatever the 
incentives are, the waiter cares about their monetary implication. For simplicity, I assume that 
                                                 
5 This is done in order to make the model traceable and to provide a precise solution to the model. The same 




6 When T = 0 we cannot scale the service quality according to the tips given, because the tip is always T0. In this 
case I scale the service quality according to the incentives provided by the firm for different quality levels in such a 
way that these incentives are linear in quality.  the monetary value of the incentives for the waiter is linear in service quality. In addition, the 
firm may have to pay the waiter a wage regardless of service quality and his tip income, for 
example because of minimum wage laws.
7  
From the waiter’s perspective, this means that the wage and the incentives provided by the 
firm have a total value of w + µs; w is given exogenously (for example it may be the minimum 
wage), s is chosen by the waiter, and µ is chosen by the firm. The value of µ represents the 
intensity of monitoring by the firm. When the firm monitors the waiters more closely (higher µ), 
its ability to punish bad waiters and reward good waiters increases, and therefore the monetary 
value of the incentives (from the waiters’ perspective) becomes steeper in service quality; that is, 
the waiters’ incentives to provide good service are increasing in µ. 
For example, a small investment in monitoring may be to dismiss waiters whom a customer 
complains about. It is very cheap, but does not provide many incentives for excellent service. 
Waiters would probably be careful not to be too rude or careless (assuming that their utility is 
strictly above their reservation utility, so they strictly prefer to keep their job), but they would not 
try very hard to provide the best service possible. A higher investment in monitoring can be to 
test the waiters’ knowledge of the menu occasionally and to employ a worker whose job is to 
watch the waiters and rate their service quality. This enables the firm to rank the performance of 
the waiters, and as a result to reward the best waiters by giving them better tables or shifts or by 
other means.  




7 In the United States the current federal law says that tipped employees should receive at least $2.13 an hour, and 
their wage and tips together should be at least equal to the minimum wage (which is currently $5.15 an hour). 
Several states adopted laws that require paying tipped workers the regular minimum wages regardless of the tips 
they earn. The important thing to notice is that the cost of monitoring for the firm is not equal to the 
monetary value of the incentives from the worker’s perspective. Although the waiter faces the 
compensation scheme w + µs, this is not the labor cost for the firm, because of two reasons. 
First, some of the expenses associated with monitoring, such as employing workers to monitor 
the waiters, are costly for the firm but are not an income for the waiters. Second, some of the 
incentives faced by the waiters are not an expense for the firm, for example giving better shifts or 
tables to the best waiters.  
The firm has also variable costs, for example the cost of food and the wages of cooks and 
managers. I assume that the total cost of producing a quantity q (the number of customers 
served) when monitoring intensity is µ is equal to: 
(   1   )           c q   +   δµ
xq,  
  where c > 0, δ > 0, and x > 1. The costs that are not related to monitoring or incentives, such 
as minimum wages for the waiters, the cost of food, and wages of cooks and managers, are 
included in cq. The cost of monitoring and providing incentives is δµ
xq; this cost includes for 
example the wages of workers who monitor the waiters. Serving more customers (higher q) 
requires additional waiters and therefore increased monitoring costs (if monitoring intensity is to 
remain constant). The cost function is based on the assumptions that total monitoring cost is 
proportional to q and that the cost of monitoring is strictly convex in monitoring intensity 
(therefore x > 1).  
  I assume that the demand faced by the firm is continuous and downward sloping in price.
8 In 
addition, the customers’ willingness to pay is strictly increasing in service quality, and I allow 




8 This precludes the case of perfect competition, but is consistent with many industry structures, for example if the the willingness to pay to be either linear or concave in service quality. The inverse demand is 
therefore a function of both the quantity sold and service quality. The inverse demand faced by 
the firm is assumed to take the following form: 
(  2  )         p(q,  s)  =  α − βq + φs
y, 
 where  β > 0, φ > 0, α > c > 0, and 0 < y ≤ 1.  
  As a result, the firm’s profit function is: 
(   3   )        π(q, µ, s) = (α − βq + φs
y − c − δµ
x)q. 
 
2.3.   The waiter 
The waiter derives income both from tips and from the firm: his total income is T0 + sT + w 
+ µs. His effort is a function of the service quality he provides. I assume that the effort function 
is strictly convex and takes a quadratic form, e(s) = E0 + E1s + E2s
2. Since we defined s = 0 to be 
the service quality that minimizes effort, it follows that E1 = 0. Strict convexity of e implies E2 > 
0. Assuming that the waiter’s utility function is quasi-linear in money, his utility is equal to:
9 
(  4  )       v(s)  =  T0 + sT + w + µs − E0 − E2s
2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm is a monopoly, or if the industry is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Restaurants differ in their 
location, the food they serve, their quality level, and sometimes in their opening hours, so the assumption of product 




9 In the context of intrinsic motivation, s represents how well the worker performs his task and T stands for the 
degree with which good performance increases the worker’s satisfaction. T0 is the degree of this satisfaction when s 
= 0.   The waiter chooses s to maximize his utility and takes T0, T, w and µ as given. To ensure 
that the individual rationality constraint (IRC) is satisfied in equilibrium (so the waiter prefers to 
work as a waiter rather than to quit and find another job), a sufficient condition is that working 
and providing zero service quality is better for the waiter than his outside option. If in 
equilibrium he chooses to provide a strictly positive service quality, it means that his utility from 
doing so is at least the utility from choosing zero service quality, and therefore the IRC is 
satisfied. If we denote the waiter’s reservation utility by v0, then the following assumption gives 
a sufficient condition for the IRC to hold: 
  ASSUMPTION 1.  T0 + w − E0 ≥ v0. 
3.  The equilibrium 
  The equilibrium can be solved for using backward induction. In the second stage, the waiter 
chooses which service quality to provide, given the tip he expects and the incentives provided by 
the firm. The following proposition describes his optimal choice: 
 PROPOSITION  1.
10  Service quality in equilibrium is s = (T + µ)/2E2. 
 
  Thus, service quality is strictly increasing in both tips (T) and monitoring intensity (µ); it is 
strictly decreasing in E2 because a higher E2 corresponds to a higher marginal cost of increasing 
service quality. Given the choice of service quality by the waiter, the firm chooses the quantity it 




10 All the proofs are in the appendix. wants to sell and the intensity of monitoring. The following proposition characterizes its optimal 
choices: 
  PROPOSITION 2.  i) The firm’s optimal choice of monitoring intensity is given by the value 
of µ that solves φy(T+µ)
y−1/(2E2)
y − δxµ
x−1 = 0. Denote this value by µ*. There exists a unique 
value of µ*, which is strictly positive. 
ii) Optimal q is given by q* = [α − c − δ(µ*)
x + φ(T + µ*)
y/(2E2)
y]/2β, and q* > 0. 
  
 The  condition  φy(T+µ)
y−1/(2E2)
y − δx(µ)
x−1 = 0 that defines the optimal value of µ may seem 
complicated, but is in fact intuitive. The marginal benefit from increasing µ is the increase in 
price that results from the improved service quality, times the quantity sold. This equals to 
q*φy(T+µ)
y−1/(2E2)
y. The marginal cost of increasing µ is q*δxµ
x−1. The condition above equates 
the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of increasing µ. How do the monitoring intensity 
chosen by the firm and equilibrium service quality depend on the tipping function of the 
customer? Corollary 1 provides the answer: 
  COROLLARY 1.  i) ∂µ*/∂T = −µ*(1−y)/[(x−1)(T+µ*)+µ*(1−y)]. It follows that if y = 1 
then ∂µ*/∂T = 0, otherwise −1 < ∂µ*/∂T < 0.
 
ii) Let s* be the service quality chosen by the waiter; then ∂s*/∂T = (1 + ∂µ*/∂T)/2E2 > 0. 
 
  Part (i) of Corollary 1 suggests that when tips are more sensitive to service quality (higher 
T), the firm chooses to reduce monitoring intensity (strictly if y < 1). The increase in the 
incentives provided by the customer when T goes up exceeds the effect of the reduced 
13 
 
 monitoring, so that in total the waiter faces more incentives to provide good service. This is the 
reason for part (ii) of the corollary, which suggests that service quality increases when T goes up 
despite the reduction in the monitoring intensity.  
  Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choice of µ (the figure corresponds to y < 1). The increasing 
curve (MC) is the marginal cost of increasing µ, per unit of output. It starts at the origin and 
increases without bound. It is strictly concave if 1 < x < 2 and strictly convex if x > 2; the figure 
corresponds to x < 2, but the only important thing for the analysis below is that MC is increasing 
in µ. MB
0 is the marginal benefit per unit of output from increasing µ, when T = T
0. It is equal to 
the increase in the price (holding the quantity sold unchanged) that results from increasing µ by 
one unit (the increase in price is a result of the higher service quality chosen by the waiter when 
µ is higher). MB
1 is the corresponding graph for T = T
1, where T
1 > T
0. Since y < 1, MB
1 is 
below MB
0. Notice that MB is strictly positive when µ = 0. In addition, when y < 1, MB is 
strictly decreasing in µ and it approaches zero as µ approaches infinity (when y = 1, MB = φ/2E2 
for all values of µ). Since MC is strictly increasing, MB is non-increasing, and MB is higher than 





1), which is the optimal value of µ. Figure 1 illustrates that 
when T increases, µ* decreases (for y < 1), as suggested by Corollary 1.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 
  How does a change in T affect the equilibrium quantity and price? The following corollary 
provides the answers: 




 > 0. 
ii) ∂p*/∂T = [(1 + 2∂µ*/∂T)δx(µ*)
x−1]/2, which can be either positive or negative. 
 
  How does T affect profits? The following proposition suggests that profits are 
unambiguously increasing in T: 
  PROPOSITION 3. Equilibrium profits are strictly increasing in T. 
4.  Discussion 
  It follows from Proposition 3 that the firm wants T to be as high as possible. This means that 
the firm should encourage customers to tip badly for poor service rather than to always tip 
generously. Moreover, any strictly positive T yields higher profits than T = 0. Assuming that 
people tip more for good service (which is supported by empirical evidence, see Lynn and 
McCall, 2000b), this implies that if the firm has the option whether to implement tipping or not, 
it should choose to use tips.
11 The reason is twofold: first, tipping provides incentives to the 
waiters and enables the firm to reduce its costly monitoring of them. Second, even after the firm 
reduces its monitoring intensity, the incentives faced by the waiters are higher than without tips, 
as suggested by Corollary 1. As a result, equilibrium service quality is higher when tipping 
exists, increasing the consumers’ willingness to pay and the firm’s profits.  
  This observation is consistent with evidence from the history of tipping. In the late 19
th 
century, when tipping began to be established in the United States, the owners of restaurants and 




11 An exception to this rule may occur when workers enjoy economic rents if tips are used, and the firm can capture 
the rent by imposing a service charge that replaces tips. More on this below. hotels were often blamed (by those who disliked tipping) to be the ones who promoted the 
custom (Segrave, 1998). An editorial in the New York Times in 1899, for example, claimed that 
the tipping practice is a wretched system that was originated and perpetuated 
not by its victims, the men who give and take tips, but by those who profit by it every year to the extent 
of millions more than a few. The real takers of tips are the hotel and restaurant proprietors, the owners 
of steamships, the offices and stock-holders of railways, and a dozen other classes of employers… 
every tip saves the payment of wages to an equal amount… This throws a flood of light on the frequent 
assertions that the abolition of the tipping system is impossible.
12 
 
  Indeed, the evidence in several industries implies that where tipping became common, 
wages were reduced to reflect the presence of tipping, although it is not clear whether the 
reduction in wages was at the same amount as the tips (Segrave, 1998).
13 But even if the claim 
that wages were driven down by the amount of tips is true, this still does not explain why 
restaurants, hotels and others had an incentive to implement tipping. For the customer, having to 
add a tip is the same as an increased price (when the increase is by the same amount as the tip).
14 
Consequently, the owner could increase prices instead of encouraging people to tip, and get the 
increased revenues directly rather than by reducing the workers’ wages. The analysis in this 
 
14 If people exhibit bounded rationality, framing effects and mental accounting may make tips seem less expensive 
than increased prices (when the increase is in the same amount as the tips). I assume here that people are rational 
and treat tips and increased prices in the same way.  
 
                                                 
12 “Topics of the Times,” The New York Times, November 21, 1899, p. 6. The quote is adopted from Segrave (1998). 
13 One might expect prices to fall when restaurants’ costs go down due to lower wages. Unfortunately, I am not 
aware of any available data on restaurant prices before and after tipping was implemented in that restaurant. 
Customers’ reactions to tipping from that period, however, suggest that prices did not fall (see Scott, 1916; Segrave, 
1998; Azar, 2003b). 
16 article suggests that the reason why firms chose to support tipping rather than to increase prices 
may be that they realized that tipping provides incentives for good service, resulting in better 
service quality and reduced monitoring costs.
15 
  The model may also provide the explanation for another puzzle. Waiters often earn income 
(tips and wages) that exceeds their reservation wages. The reason is that usually the firm cannot 
take the tips away from the waiters, and wages are often required by law to be above a certain 
minimum. The firm can increase its profits if it can take this economic rent from the waiters. 
Different firms tried different methods to extract this economic rent: in some cases, for example, 
waiters paid for the privilege to work and receive tips (Segrave, 1998; Seligman, 1998). 
    Today, many restaurants require that the waiters split the tips with other workers, for 
example with the busboys. This enables the restaurant to pay lower wages to the busboys and is a 
way of extracting some of the economic rent from the waiters. In the United States, however, 
these arrangements, called “tip outs,” are limited by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Tipped 
employees cannot be forced by employers to share tips with employees who do not ordinarily 
participate in tip-pooling arrangements (such as janitors and dishwashers). In addition, if tip-
pooling exceeds 15 percent of the tips, the Department of Labor will investigate to assure that the 
pooling agreement is “customary and reasonable” (Wessels, 1997).  




15 Today, another benefit for the firms of implementing tipping is that the waiters usually do not report their entire 
tip income to the tax authorities (see Hemenway, 1993). Consequently, the net income of the waiters is higher than 
what it would be if the firm paid them the same amount (of the tips) as wages. The firm, in turn, can capture at least 
some of this additional surplus by various means (see the discussion below). While this reason might support tipping 
today, it cannot explain why US firms supported tipping in the 19
th century, since income taxes were introduced in 
the US only in the 20
th century. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this important point.    Similarly, the firm can reduce the waiters’ economic rent by giving each waiter less tables to 
serve or requiring him to do non-tipped activities as well. Giving waiters only a few tables, 
however, does not contribute to the restaurant’s profits beyond a certain point, so it reduces the 
waiters’ economic rents but does not transfer them to the restaurant (instead, it simply reduces 
efficiency). Similarly, asking a skilled waiter to either perform tasks that can be done by cheaper 
labor (e.g. clean tables or dishes) or that require different skills (e.g. being responsible for 
purchasing and inventory) is inefficient and therefore can transfer the economic rents of the 
waiters to the restaurant only partially. 
  There is a simpler way, however, to extract all the rent: add a 15-percent service charge to 
the bill (that replaces the tip), pay the waiters their reservation wages, and keep the rest (or 
alternatively, increase prices by 15 percent and declare that the restaurant has a policy of no 
tipping). Why do US restaurants retain tipping and do not use this method? The answer may be 
that they are aware of the incentives that tips provide for good service and they realize that 
tipping saves costly monitoring. Customers, at least, seem to be aware of the positive effect of 
tips on service quality; most of them want to retain their freedom in choosing how much to 
reward the waiter, and oppose replacing tipping with service charges.
16  
  In Europe, however, the situation is different. Many restaurants impose a service charge 
instead of allowing the customer to choose the tip. The model suggests that this policy increases 




16 In an on-line poll in www.tipping.org, a website dedicated to tipping, one of the questions posted was “Would you 
tolerate higher prices at a restaurant in order to do away with tips?” On April 2, 2003, out of 1633 voters, 26% 
answered positively, 56% negatively, and the rest answered “maybe” or “unsure.” Service charges and higher prices 
are equivalent from the customer’s perspective since both are an expense for the customer and do not provide 
incentives to the waiters. monitoring costs and reduces profits. Why do European restaurants adopt this policy? There are 
at least five possible explanations.
17 First, European firms might make a mistake. Second, they 
may be afraid that too many customers would act opportunistically and will not tip.
18 Third, it 
seems that in Europe pay is less linked to performance than in the United States more generally, 
possibly reflecting differences in values and attitudes. This might be another reason why tipping 
is more popular in the United States than in Europe.
19 Fourth, tipping is often thought to create 
different classes (see for example Segrave, 1998); European countries may have more resistance 
to this because of different values.
20 Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993), for example, found that 
tipping was less prevalent in countries with a low tolerance for status and power differences 
between people.  
  Finally, the reason for implementing service charges in European restaurants may be to 
extract an economic rent enjoyed by the waiters when they receive tips. This reason is more 
                                                 
17 These explanations may also be the reason why other countries in which tipping is not common (such as Japan, 
Australia and the Scandinavian countries) do not adopt tipping.  
18 This explanation is not very plausible, as it raises the question why would European customers behave so 
differently from American customers, who rarely stiff according to empirical evidence (Bodvarsson and Gibson, 
1997). 




20 I thank an anonymous referee for making this point. As this referee suggests, status may also be the reason why 
some occupations are tipped while others are not: those who receive tips tend to work in lower-status jobs, and this 
might explain why we do not tip doctors, lawyers, and university lecturers, among others, despite the advantages of 
tipping in improving service quality and increasing the firm’s profits. A full discussion of the reasons for different 
tipping practices in different occupations is very interesting but is beyond the scope of this article; the interested 
reader is referred to Azar (2003c), who discusses this topic in detail.  likely if the firm is obligated to pay minimum wages regardless of tips, because then the waiter’s 
income (and therefore the potential economic rent) is much higher. Indeed, in Israel when a court 
decided that waiters should receive minimum wages in addition to tips, many restaurants 
replaced tipping with service charges (Sinay, 2001). Whether minimum wage laws are indeed the 
reason for the differences between the tipping practices in the United States and in Europe, 
however, remains a topic for future research.
21 
5.  Conclusion 
  The article explores how the optimal choice of monitoring by the firm is affected by external 
incentives that the worker faces. The theoretical model uses the example of tipping, but applies 
also to the cases of intrinsic motivation that causes the worker to derive satisfaction from a job 
well done and of reputation building in order to increase one’s value in the job market.  
  The analysis suggests that tips have the potential to motivate workers to provide good service 
quality, and by doing so also to reduce the need for costly monitoring of workers by the firm. 
The extent to which tips realize this potential depends on the sensitivity of tips to service quality. 




21 Ideally, we would like to compare laws, court decisions (if applicable) and actual practices regarding whether 
tipped employs should receive minimum wages in addition to tips between the United States and European countries 
(as well as other countries). If minimum wages are imposed in tipped occupations, we should also consider the 
relative level of minimum wages. We would then want to estimate the total income of waiters and compare it to 
income in similar occupations to see whether service charges are used in those countries in which waiters enjoy 
particularly high economic rents (if tips are to be used). In addition, it would be interesting to examine whether 
changes in tipping practices followed changes in legislation about minimum wages of tipped employees. This 
project is beyond the scope of the current article, and will most likely require a team of authors who have control of 
all the relevant languages.  The higher this sensitivity is, the more motivation tips provide for the workers and the more the 
firm can reduce its costly monitoring. As a result, the firm’s profits are increasing in the 
sensitivity of tips to service quality, meaning that the firm should encourage customers not to tip 
for bad service. In addition, the firm’s profits are higher when tips are used than when a fixed 
service charge is imposed. An exception to this rule occurs when tipped workers receive income 
that exceeds their reservation wages. By replacing tips with a service charge the firm may then 
capture the workers’ economic rent, and in this case a service charge may increase the firm’s 
profits compared to tips.  
  In the context of intrinsic motivation, the conclusion is that firms should try to increase the 
sensitivity of the worker’s satisfaction to his performance level, for example by providing him 
more feedback about his performance. This will improve the worker’s effort, reduce the costs of 
monitoring, and increase profits. 
  The theoretical contribution in this paper is a first step in a direction that warrants future 
research. One interesting idea is to examine the case of a worker who has two tasks, one of 
which carries external incentives and the other does not. For example, professors are required to 
teach and to do research. While research output affects significantly the professor’s reputation 
and therefore his salary (whether he stays in the same institution or not), teaching quality does 
not affect his salary significantly in most research-oriented institutions. It would be interesting to 
examine how the equilibrium and optimal monitoring of the two tasks look like in this case. 
Additional interesting questions are whether professors spend too much time on research relative 
to teaching because of the external incentives mentioned, and whether business schools, in which 
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 teaching quality is considered very important, monitor teaching more carefully than other 
departments.
22 
  Another interesting idea for future research is to test empirically the predictions of the 
model. This seems to be easier with respect to the tipping example than with intrinsic motivation. 
How do monitoring costs and service quality compare between restaurants that use tipping and 
those that use service charges?
23 In a restaurant that imposes a fixed-percentage gratuity for large 
parties, as is common in US restaurants, do waiters give small parties better service than they 
provide to large parties?  
  It is also interesting to examine more closely the policy of firms in several countries to 
replace tips with service charges. When did European restaurants start to replace tips with 
service charges? Why do they adopt this policy? Does it enable the restaurant to capture an 
economic rent enjoyed by the waiters when they receive tips? If so, what are the main 
differences that cause tipping to be prevalent in the United States but not in Europe? Different 
minimum wage laws? Different attitudes of customers toward the tipping custom? As a 
challenging economic phenomenon that has hardly been explored by economists, tipping offers 
many opportunities for future research; the above questions are only a partial list (for a more 
complete list, see Azar, 2003d). 
                                                 




23 One should take into account, however, that the decision whether to impose service charges or to use tips is 
endogenous and therefore may reflect the characteristics of the restaurant in terms of its service quality, monitoring 
costs, and so on. Appendix: Proofs 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  The waiter chooses s to maximize v(s) = T0 + sT + w + µs − E0 
− E2s
2. The first-order condition is given by T + µ −2E2s = 0, or s = (T + µ)/2E2. The second-
order condition is satisfied because E2 > 0.                          
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  Substituting s = (T + µ)/2E2 in ( 3 ) we get:  
( 5 )         π(q, µ) = [α − βq + φ((T + µ)/2E2)
y − c − δµ
x]q. 
The optimal values µ* and q* have to satisfy the following first-order conditions (subscripts 
denote partial derivatives): 
( 6 )         πµ = q*φy(T + µ*)
y−1/(2E2)
y − q*δx(µ*)
x−1 = 0, and 
(   7   )       πq = α − 2βq* + φ(T + µ*)
y/(2E2)
y − c − δ(µ*)
x = 0. 
  The second-order sufficient conditions are:  
(   8   )          πqq (q*, µ*) = −2β < 0, 
( 9 )   πµµ (q*, µ*) =  q*φy(y − 1)(T + µ*)
y−2/(2E2)
y − q*δx(x − 1)(µ*)
x−2 < 0, and 
(  10  )      πµµ(q*, µ*)πqq(q*, µ*) − [πµq(q*, µ*)]
2 > 0. 
 Since  α > c, the firm can always make strictly positive profits by choosing µ = 0 and a small 
positive q; therefore, q* ≠ 0, because choosing q = 0 yields zero profits. Since q* ≠ 0, divide ( 6 ) 
by q* to get that Z ≡ φy(T+µ*)
y−1/(2E2)
y − δx(µ*)
x−1 = 0. To see that the value of µ* that solves 
this equation exists and is unique and strictly positive, notice that Z(µ* = 0) > 0, and as µ* 
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 approaches ∞, Z goes to −∞ (recall that x > 1 and 0 < y ≤ 1). It is easy to verify that Z is 
continuous and strictly decreasing in µ*; it follows that there is a unique and strictly positive 
value of µ* for which Z = 0. 
  From ( 7 ) it follows that q* = [α − c − δ(µ*)
x + φ(T + µ*)
y/(2E2)
y]/2β. Since we did not 
incorporate the restriction q ≥ 0 in the maximization problem, we have to make sure that this 




x. Using ( 6 ), φ(T + µ*)
y/(2E2)
y = δx(µ*)
x−1(T + µ*)/y. That is, the sufficient condition 
becomes δx(µ*)
x−1(T + µ*)/y ≥ δ(µ*)
x. Divide both sides by δ(µ*)
x−1 to get the condition x(T + 
µ*)/y ≥ µ*. Since x > 1 ≥ y and T ≥ 0, this is satisfied. 
  Next, consider the second-order conditions. Notice that ( 8 ) is satisfied because β > 0. In 
addition, πµq (q*, µ*) = φy(T + µ*)
y−1/(2E2)
y − δx(µ*)
x−1; since q* ≠ 0, it follows from ( 6 ) that 
πµq (q*, µ*) = 0. Therefore, if ( 9 ) is satisfied, the inequality in ( 10 ) follows immediately. 
Using ( 6 ), we get that πµµ (q*, µ*) = q*δx(µ*)
x−1[(y − 1)/(T + µ*) − (x − 1)/µ*]. Therefore, the 
sign of πµµ (q*, µ*) is equal to the sign of [(y − 1)/(T + µ*) − (x − 1)/µ*] = [(y − 1)µ* − (x − 1)(T 
+ µ*)]/µ*(T + µ*) = [µ*(y − x) − T(x − 1)]/µ*(T + µ*) < 0, where the last inequality follows 
from T ≥ 0, µ* > 0 and x > 1 ≥ y. Therefore, all the second-order conditions are satisfied. This 
completes the proof.                                    
 




x−1 = 0. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, ∂µ*/∂T = −HT/Hµ*. Notice 
that HT = φy(y − 1)(T + µ*)
y−2/(2E2)
y = (y−1)δx(µ*)
x−1/(T+µ*), using Proposition 2(i). Similarly, 
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 Hµ* = (y−1)δx(µ*)
x−1/(T+µ*) − δx(x − 1)(µ*)
x−2. Substituting and simplifying we then get that 
∂µ*/∂T = −HT/Hµ* = −µ*(1−y)/[(x−1)(T+µ*)+µ*(1−y)], which is equal to zero when y = 1 and is 
between −1 and 0 (not including the endpoints) when y < 1 (recall that x > 1). This completes 
part (i). Part (ii) follows immediately: s* = (T + µ*)/2E2 implies that ∂s*/∂T = (1 + ∂µ*/∂T)/2E2 
> 0.                                               
 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2.  i) Recall that q* = [α − c − δ(µ*)
x + φ(T + µ*)
y/(2E2)
y]/2β, and 
that µ* is derived from an equation that does not involve q* (see Proposition 2(i)). This implies 
that  ∂q*/∂T = [φy(T + µ*)
y−1(1 + ∂µ*/∂T)/(2E2)





x−1 (this equation is a simple rearrangement of Proposition 2(i)), it 
follows that ∂q*/∂T = δx(µ*)
x−1/2β > 0. 
  ii) Notice that equilibrium price satisfies p*(q*, s*) = α − βq* + φ(s*)
y = [α + φ(s*)
y + c + 
δ(µ*)
x]/2. Consequently, ∂p*/∂T = [φy(s*)
y−1∂s*/∂T + δx(µ*)
x−1∂µ*/∂T]/2. Substituting s* = (T 




x−1∂µ*/∂T]/2. Using again φy(T+µ*)
y−1/(2E2)
y = δx(µ*)
x−1 (from Proposition 2(i)), we get 
∂p*/∂T = [(1 + 2∂µ*/∂T)δx(µ*)
x−1]/2. The sign of this expression is equal to the sign of (1 + 
2∂µ*/∂T). Recall from Corollary 1(i) that ∂µ*/∂T = −µ*(1−y)/[(x−1)(T+µ*)+µ*(1−y)]. When y 
is close to 1 and x is not, ∂µ*/∂T is close to zero, and ∂p*/∂T > 0. When x is close to 1 and y is 
not, ∂µ*/∂T is close to −1 and ∂p*/∂T < 0. This completes part (ii).                  
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Recall that π(q, µ) = [α − βq + φ((T + µ)/2E2)




 Using the Envelope Theorem, dπ*/dT = ∂π*/∂T = q*φy(T + µ*)
y−1/(2E2)
y
 > 0.                         
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